What role did ideology play in Iran's support for terrorism in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution? What, if anything, has changed since then with respect to ideology?



The success of the Islamic Revolution caused a kind of manifest destiny for the new Iranian clerical elite. Their ultimate desire was to export Islam until the entire world was one mighty caliphate. Iran, unfortunately, was a weakling at the playground; in addition to the other more secular Arab nations, there was always the twin spectres of America and the Soviet Union, always looking over Iran's shoulders. They were the big bullies, pushing around all the kids in a fight between each other.



Through clandestine means, Iran quickly made America the enemy. Seizing American hostages brought the Iranian Revolution to the forefront of American evening news. But it was the ongoing campaign of terror against the West that really made Iran stand out as a sponsor of terror. "The ideology of the revolution insipred Iran in its initial intervention and has played an important role in shaping Iran's backing of Hizballah to this day" (Bynam 91). Hizballah was recruited to make life miserable for Westerners throughout the Middle East, especially those directly associated with Israel and its neighbors. "Hizballah quickly became the tip of the spear in the effort to expel the Americans, other Western peacekeepers, and the Israelis from Lebanon" (84). With twin explosion at the US Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, Hizballah justified its existence. Their continued terror activities made life difficult for those perceived to defy Iran.



Through terrorism, Iran continued to persecute those who stood in its way. Because Hizballah operated out of Lebanon, later terrorist acts were difficult to pin precisely onto Iran's shoulders. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hizballah and Iran continued to work in concert, hijacking and bombing the infidels in the Middle East and throughout the world (85). "For Iran's new leaders, supporting Islam meant supporting revolution... Iran's leaders saw themselves on the defensive yet believed that aggressively promoting their revolution was the best means of ensuring their survival" (92).



Over time, Iran has seen that not all foreign policy is seen through the prism of terrorism.



Iran's intimate relationship with Hizballah became more distant over time, though by the standards of most state-sponsored terrorist groups the two remain extremely close. Iran's support for Hizballah changed for several reasons: a decline in Iran's revolutionary ardor; Hizballah's increased awareness of, and responsiveness to, Lebanon's political and geostrategic realities; and growing costs of outside pressure (99).



After the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran lost its zeal in exporting the revolution. "Many leaders became disenchanted with the pan-Islamic vision put forth by Khomeini" (100). This disillusionment has been underscored by Iran's willingness to elect more moderate leaders. Despite President Ahmadinejad's fiery zeal, the imperial Islamic fervor seen in the early 1980s has diminished overall.



As well, Hizballah has become Lebanonized. The firebrand zealots under Iranian employ have lived in Lebanon for decades now; "all political movements had to accomodate themselves to Damascus" (103) rather than Tehran. Over time, the fiery zeal has diminshed to a warm pit of embers: zeal that has cooled to a tolerable level, but still warmth that can reignite at a moment's notice.



Source:

Bynam, Daniel. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2005.